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The purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical roots of mission 
command as a norm for how to samhandle [“interact”] when facing the 
unforeseen in high-risk military operations. Throughout history, both 
practitioners and researchers have seemed to agree that war and con-
flict imply a high degree of uncertainty. Due to this pervasive uncer-
tainty, the development of military command systems has, according 
to van Creveld (1985:264), “From Plato to NATO…been an endless 
quest for certainty.” Where is the enemy? Who is the enemy? What is 
the weather going to be like? Not to mention your own forces’ activi-
ties and intentions. In a rather sharp contrast to the agreement when 
it comes to uncertainty as a defining character of military operations, 
there has been and perhaps still is, strong disagreement when it comes 
to the design of military command systems (Murray, 2011). However, 
one command system stands out in an almost mythically canonized 
way, namely Auftragstaktik (Shamir, 2011). 
As a command system, Auftragstaktik embraces both a tactical norm 
(maneuver warfare), and a norm for how to samhandle (mission com-
mand), which will be the main focus in this chapter. In Norway’s case, 
mission command was implemented in response to a lesson identified 
after a tragic accident where 16 soldiers died, as a measure to improve the 
ability to samhandle when facing uncertainty (NOU 1991:19). However, 
in an interesting comment to the implementation of mission command 
in Norway, Lind (2001:19) writes that the Norwegian government did 
not have “the slightest idea of what it is.” And in more recent research, it 
is claimed that mission command has not been implemented yet, more 
than 20 years after it was formally implemented (Krabberød, 2017). 
But also international research indicates that implementing mission 
command is challenging (Muth, 2016; Shamir, 2011; Vandergriff, 2015). 
One challenge that has been identified, perhaps the most important, is 
pedagogical – how to educate military personnel in the use of mission 
command. Thus the challenge of how to develop and train military per-
sonnel to be able to act according to the mission command norm will 
be discussed.
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The non-repetitive character of war
If we define complexity as unpredictability that can vary from a high to a 
low degree, then chaos will represent states or situations where it is mean-
ingless to calculate probabilities. Anything may happen. War will always 
be characterized by uncertainty and chaos, because there is a thinking 
opponent who thinks he or she can win; if not, there would be no war 
(Herwig, 1988:75). This makes the uncertainty and chaos aspect fundamen-
tal; you can never be sure what the enemy’s next move will be. In addition, 
there is what Clausewitz (1832/1976:119) termed “friction”, which are the 
“factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” Clausewitz describes 
friction as a force that makes the apparently easy so difficult. In the Bow-tie 
Model (Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), these challenges are presented as three 
phases (warning signs, event/accident (UN-0) and recovery).
In modern times, two very different kinds of organizational designs 
have been established as formulas for how a military organization should 
samhandle, in order to avoid the demoralizing effects of mastering a con-
tinuous stream of unpredictable high-risk situations, and win. In one 
design, the intention is to enforce order on the battlefield by focusing on 
pre-planning, centralization and strict internal organization as mecha-
nisms to secure effective samhandling. In the other design, the intention 
is to use the chaos of the battlefield as an advantage. The purpose is to 
increase the enemy’s perception of chaos and thereby increase the enemy’s 
friction, by exploiting windows of opportunity quickly and in unpredict-
able ways. This school focuses on agility, initiative and decentralization. 
The mechanism for ensuring samhandling is the intention and not the 
plan. Thus, in an almost paradoxical way, two diametrically-opposed 
organizational designs have been developed as norms for handling the 
same challenge: effective samhandling when facing the unforeseen. 
Order and structure as mechanisms  
for samhandling
When the Dutch wanted to start an uprising against their Spanish rulers, 
they needed to develop a new way to fight if they were to be able to defeat 
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the superior Spanish army. Fortunately for the Dutch, a large part of the 
Spanish army was taken by a heavy storm in the English Channel on 
its way to conquer England. Additionally, the Spanish fleet was attacked 
by English warships and a significant part of the Spanish forces were 
lost. This gave the commander of the Dutch forces, Maurice of Nassau, a 
golden opportunity to organize a new army.
Inspired by his brother, who was a historian and had studied ancient 
Roman drill manuals, Maurice of Nassau developed an army organized 
like the Roman Legion, but using muskets as their main weapon. He found 
out that the soldiers had to perform 16 movements between firing the 
musket until it was ready to fire again (Parker, 1988:21). These movements 
could be drilled so that they were performed automatically, regardless of 
the chaos that ruled on the battlefield. The timespan for completing the 
drill laid the basis for the number of rows the soldiers were organized in. 
They were set up in eight rows, where the first row fired their weapons 
and then stepped back and began performing the 16 movements. At the 
same time, all the others took one step forward. When the full drill was 
completed, the row that had fired their weapons first, had moved, step-
by-step, forward to the front row again, and were loaded and ready to 
fire their second shots (Parker, 1988:20). All soldiers were led by officers 
and all movements were commenced on command. If the enemy tried to 
outflank them, only one command (e.g. turn right) was required to turn 
the front towards the enemy.
An important prerequisite for this drill to work in battle was that the 
soldiers must arrive on the battlefield in the same formation they were 
going to fight in. Thus, Maurice implemented close-order drills as an 
important part of his tactics. The soldiers were drilled to stop on the 
same foot, raise their guns simultaneously and fire at the same time. 
If the enemy came from an unexpected direction, the troops could be 
moved quickly to the new location or direction. The crucial thing was 
that they did not lose the basic eight-row order, which was the basis for 
the sequence of firing and recharging the musket (Rothenberg, 1986:43). 
In this system, there was no room for independent action or initiative, 
beyond fulfilling one’s role in the larger system. Obedience, in the form 
of complete and immediate execution of orders, was the requirement. 
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According to Max Weber, it was this tactic that made gunpowder a sig-
nificant force multiplier on the battlefield; it was not the gunpowder that 
developed the tactics (Weber, 1978:1152).
In the war against the Spanish, Maurice’s way of fighting turned out 
to be superior. The Spaniards were not able to develop a tactic that could 
beat the Dutch, and all the rulers of Europe marveled at what Maurice 
had developed and tried to copy his tactics. One of those who found 
inspiration in Maurice of Nassau’s tactics was King Gustav Adolf of Swe-
den. He developed the tactics to be used offensively, each line now going 
forward and passing by the others while they were charging. In that way, 
the army could roll forward.
In the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, this way of fighting turned out to 
be superior once again. The Swedes had been assigned a role as the Sax-
ons’ reserve troops in the battle, but after General Tilly, the leader of the 
German-Roman forces, had broken the Saxons, he turned his forces to 
the Swedes’ flanks and attacked. However, in what seemed to Tilly as an 
incomprehensibly short time, the Swedes had maneuvered their forces. 
What Tilly thought was the Swedish flank had now become their main 
front, and the Swedish forces rolled systematically towards Tilly’s. Tilly 
failed to reorganize his forces and they were crushed. Nine thousand 
prisoners of war were enrolled in the Swedish army and trained in its way 
of fighting, which made the Swedish army even more terrifying (Roth-
enberg, 1986:52; Wilson, 2009:472–75). Gustav Adolf ’s great victories and 
the unexpected success of the new tactics made almost everyone copy 
them, except in the Ottoman Empire, where they still believed more in 
individual skills than organization. The Ottoman Empire thereby started 
its long decline, which led to a full dissolution of the empire. In this light, 
Napoleon’s statement that, “whereas one Mameluke was the equal of 
three Frenchmen, one hundred Frenchmen could confidently take on five 
times their number in Mamelukes” (Høiback, 2014:293), is rather inter-
esting; that is, organization is the key. 
Out of the ruins of the Thirty Years’ War, Prussia survived. From being 
a poor scattered backdrop, the Hohenzollern’s kingdom grew strong, by 
becoming the best in class on strict organizational structure on the bat-
tlefield. Frederick the Great’s victorious army functioned on the basis of 
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the maxim, “No one reasons, everyone executes” (Palmer, 1986:99). How-
ever, in the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, Prussia lost to Napoleon’s army 
both times. To Prussia, these were shocking defeats, and they led to a pro-
longed and profound reform in the Prussian, and later German, forces. 
In the Prussians’ own analyses of what had failed, it became apparent 
that not only did Napoleon’s soldiers have higher morals but, perhaps 
even more importantly, the French forces were able to utilize windows of 
opportunity faster than the Prussians; they were far more agile.1
Auftragstaktik – harvesting the fruits of chaos 
as a strategy for samhandling
Learning is a difficult exercise, also for military organizations (Murray, 
2011). For what should be learned? There may be many explanations for a 
defeat, but if you change too much, it may be that the things that worked 
well will also be affected. However, many organizations conclude that 
“bad luck” or the failure to follow plans or procedures are the main expla-
nations if something goes wrong, and consequently little is changed. Be 
that as it may, the Prussians did not follow this path and their defeat to 
Napoleon led to massive innovation and organizational development. 
Scharnhorst, who himself participated in the Jena-Auerstadt battles, 
was responsible for the reforms and started a thorough process. Merce-
naries fight without heart and had to be replaced by conscripts. Nobility 
was no guarantee of effective leadership, and all officers had to attend a 
military academy. And during a war, the officers had to have the oppor-
tunity to make decisions based on their own judgment, so they could 
act without first sending a request for permission through the chain of 
command, thus saving time. It was not the lack of courage but rather the 
lack of wisdom and initiative that had been the main problem when they 
were beaten by Napoleon. The problem, as perceived by Scharnhorst, was 
1 It is interesting to note that Maurice’s reforms gained their renaissance in civilian working life, 
when Fredric Taylor introduced them as principles for organizing the workplace. Taylorism, or 
“Scientific Management” as his school is called, studied the workers’ movements to reduce all the 
unnecessary ones and standardize the most effective in task-work procedures. Along with orga-
nizing the production lines, this led to an explosion in productivity, and became an important 
formula for organizational design in the United States.
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the norm “Nie eine Schritt ohne Befehl”; that is, the operation was to be 
carried out according to plan and if changes were to be made, they would 
be implemented by the commander-in-chief (Oetting, 1993:42–43). 
In 1857, Helmuth von Moltke was appointed Chief of the Prussian Gen-
eral Staff, a position he held for 30 years, and he gave new impetus to the 
reforms Scharnhorst had started. Moltke abandoned the idea that inter-
nal order and structure could tame the chaos of war. As Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff, he was stunned by the huge amounts of paper and the degree 
of detail that were needed to formulate orders to his own forces. Moltke 
claimed that, “as a rule, an order should contain only what the subor-
dinate, for the achievement of his goals, cannot determine on his own.” 
(Muth, 2016). The non-repetitive character of war implies that no one can 
know in advance which decision is the best; on the contrary, decisions 
in war are taken in a fog of uncertainty, by the person on the spot. “To 
know” is a luxury reserved for historians (Oetting, 1993:105). 
Moltke was convinced that on the battlefield, haste was essential. 
Thus, in Moltke’s system, the worst sin was to be passive and wait for 
orders. The second worst was not to think, and to execute orders that the 
enemy might have made irrelevant, instead of acting on the basis of one’s 
own judgment of the situation (Oetting, 1993:117). Fast and self-reliant 
action was the new norm. It was crucial to have the shortest UN-interval 
(unforeseen-interval, see Chapter 1). To begin with, only army command-
ers were authorized to make adjustments based on their own judgment, 
but after a while, this authority was decentralized to corps commanders, 
and then to commanders of regiments, company commanders and finally, 
in 1877, it was set as a requirement that the army should be a decentralized 
organization. Everyone, from the oldest General to the youngest soldier, 
was expected to show initiative and take appropriate action. 
As commander-in-chief, Moltke did not perceive it as his primary task 
to make detailed plans for how his forces should solve their missions. 
His job was to try to keep up with what was happening, in order to have 
an updated situational awareness and, on that basis, send out strategic 
guidelines and intentions, for the purpose of supporting and coordinat-
ing further actions (Wittmann, 2012). Soldiers had to learn to act on less 
information. They had to be given less restrictive instructions and more 
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leeway, by using general directives (Bungay, 2011). Any plan, regardless of 
how meticulously it was laid out, would be offset when meeting the enemy 
(Gross, 2016:29). In the system that emphasized strict internal order and 
structure as mechanisms for effective samhandling, the response to a lack 
of information was to seek more, and the response to subordinates that 
did not do exactly what they were told was to give them supplementary 
instructions and tighten control, and the response to uncertainty and 
risk was better and more detailed plans. 
How radical Moltke’s system was cannot, probably, be overestimated. 
The belief that order and structure could tame the battlefield was replaced 
by an acknowledgment that war consisted of unforeseen events, that had 
to be exploited when and where they arose, and without certain knowl-
edge of the outcome. Rather than meeting friction with structure, the 
fruits of chaos should be harvested. By exploiting windows of opportunity 
faster than the enemy, the ambition was to create more unforeseen events 
for the enemy; new elements of surprise, i.e. new DU-intervals, that the 
enemy had to use time and energy to figure out. The basic assumption in 
Moltke’s strategy is that as the enemy no longer manages to make sense of 
the surroundings and create a meaningful basis for samhandling, he will 
mentally collapse and surrender. This formula for samhandling is called 
Auftragstaktik (Shamir, 2011).
However, Auftragstaktik is a very ambitious norm. It is naïve to think 
that harmonized samhandling will occur spontaneously, and an organ-
ization cannot be ordered to function in a decentralized manner. Auf-
tragstaktik is a certain organizational culture (Vandergriff, 2015). Moltke 
emphasized that Auftragstaktik was something that had to be trained, 
practiced and lived, on all levels in the organization. It had to be social-
ized (Muth, 2016). This had implications for officer selection, personnel 
administration and, last but not least, education. 
Through conscious training, the officers developed an intuitive knowl-
edge of their commanding officers’, peers’ and subordinates’ thinking 
and how they approached tactical challenges. This established a basis for 
an implicit mutual adjustment when facing unforeseen situations. In an 
interview with John Boyd (1982), German World War II General Blumen-
tritt explains:
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“a common outlook, based upon a body of professional officers who have re-
ceived exactly the same training during the long years of peace and with the same 
tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of 
officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.” (Boyd, 1982:74).
After completing education at the academy, officers in the German army 
served in the same unit their entire career, where they also continued their 
education. If a unit had casualties during battle, they were not replaced 
individually. In order to maintain the degree of cohesion and common 
outlook needed to operate in a decentralized fashion, a whole unit was 
replaced by another unit. (Van Creveld, 1982:75–76). Cohesion and com-
mon outlook were deemed more important than merely unit size. 
In Martin van Creveld’s (1982) comparative study of the Wehrmacht 
and the US Army during World War II, he shows that, although the 
conception of how to fight a war was relatively similar, and the Amer-
ican doctrine was almost a pure translation of the German doctrine in 
which Auftragstaktik was described, the two forces ended up fighting very 
differently. In a study of the US officer’s education before WWII, Muth 
(2011) claims that an important reason why the US Army failed to deal 
with chaos as well as the German Wehrmacht, despite having attempted 
to copy Auftragstaktik, was to be found in their pedagogical approach. 
The officers had not learned to trust their own judgment when having to 
make decisions in unforeseen situations. Instead, as cadets, they had been 
trained in hunting for the school’s solution.
Educating for the unforeseen
Torgersen, Steiro and Saeverot (2015:297) raise the question whether it is 
at all possible to train for something that is not yet known. Is it possible to 
put in place some educational principles for how to train in a structured 
way, in order to reduce the UN-interval? Torgersen, Steiro and Saeverot 
(2015) believe that it is possible to present what they refer to as a “fourth 
way”. Particularly interesting in this context is that the authors explic-
itly write that they base “the fourth way” on “military experience-based 
learning models” (Torgersen et al., 2015:297). They further argue that 
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the model focuses on “generic general skills and the competence needed 
to solve complex military missions” (“the demands of war”) and that, 
“the goal is to develop the soldiers’ competence to act when facing the 
‘demands of war’.” (Torgersen et al., 2015:301).
The “fourth way” differs from the other three in that it is based on 
“indirect education”; that is, the students are given the opportunity to 
solve new problems by themselves, to gain experience that is, as far as pos-
sible, self-generated and thereby they become more aware and confident 
in dealing with new situations. The problem with the other three “direct 
education models” is that the teacher remains the master and thereby con-
trols the student’s thinking when acting in unforeseen situations. Done 
that way, it shines through that there is one, and only one, solution to the 
problem, and that is the teacher’s solution. Thus, the student’s mindset is 
directed towards finding out how the teacher would solve the problem, 
rather than reaching a solution by himself. Hence, the teacher in fact pre-
vents the student from becoming confident in his or her ability to act in 
unforeseen situations. The same problem applies when role modeling is an 
important part of an education; the student is socialized into a pattern that 
has to be followed. (Torgersen, Steiro & Saeverot, 2015:301–304).
But as we have explained above, two very different ways of organizing 
have crystallized in order to be able to samhandle effectively in war, that is, 
reduce the UN-interval faster than the enemy. One strategy that focuses 
on strict internal order and adherence to a detailed plan, and another 
strategy, Auftragstaktik, where the focus is to ride the chaos and thereby 
confuse and demoralize the enemy. And according to military histori-
ans, how you train will decide whether the organizational culture will 
be a centralized, order culture or decentralized (Boyd, 1986; Vandergriff, 
2006; Shamir, 2011). It has even been argued that by using improper ped-
agogy, military organizations have ended up with an order culture, even 
though they believed that they were training for Auftragstaktik (Muth, 
2011; van Creveld, 1982; Vandergriff, 2015). It may therefore appear that 
“the demands of the war” can give rise to widely different educational 
arrangements. 
The issues with direct education, as outlined by Torgersen, Steiro and 
Saeverot (2015), are described in a number of studies as an explanation 
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for why military organizations fail to implement a decentralized organi-
zation that will be effective when facing the unforeseen in high risk envi-
ronments (Creveld, 1985; Muth, 2011; Vandergriff, 2006). And in a similar 
manner, but with positive signs, indirect education seems to harmonize 
with Moltke’s and several others’ logic of how to educate soldiers in order 
to develop and maintain an Auftragstaktik culture. 
The essence of the pedagogy that formed the basis of the Auftragtaktik 
was that the cadets should learn to think, and the instructors focused on 
what the cadets did in new and complex situations. The crucial thing was 
whether the cadet showed willingness to solve the problem and not what 
the cadet had already learned. It was not the solution in itself that was 
the learning objective, but how the cadets reasoned before they arrived 
at a decision, and their ability to elaborate on and defend their choice 
to their peers. By exercising defending and explaining difficult decisions 
that were made in new and complex situations, the cadets developed their 
character. The worst thing a cadet could do was to not make a decision. 
Inability to make independent decisions, or inability to substantiate their 
decisions could result in relegation. 
Leadership in war was a function of the officers’ ability to apply their 
professional judgment in chaotic, unexpected situations, which is quite 
different from applying preplanned responses, that is, standardized drills 
and procedures, to predictable situations. In Moltke’s system, the empha-
sis was on learning how to think about a problem, rather than what to 
think in pre-defined, clear-cut situations (Vandergriff, 2006). As exem-
plified by a superintendent of the German Military Academy:
“In training officers, I will pose a problem for them in field exercises that can-
not be solved within the framework of their explicit orders. For example, to go 
through one element of your division and lead a river crossing [sic!]. But there was 
also a hill to the right, and enemy forces were moving toward that hill to threaten 
the division flank. The young officer had to see that the proper response was to 
change his own orders and protect the division flank by taking the hill, thereby 
making it possible for the division to cross the river later. This is the essence of 
Auftragstaktik, to be free to interpret orders so as to fulfill the larger goal. If they 
can’t see that, they get poor marks. If the pattern persists, they will eventually be 
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marked as either too stupid or to servile to ever be effective field commanders, 
and get pushed aside into less responsible positions. ” (Rochlin, 1995:6). 
Conclusion
To be able to samhandle effectively in the face of the unknown, under 
time pressure and high risk, is to put high expectations on an organiza-
tion. In modern military history, two fundamentally different strategies 
for samhandling in response to the “demands of war” are presented, one 
based on strict, internal order and one based on initiative and “riding” 
the chaos, which is called Auftragstaktik. History has shown that if you 
are to succeed in operating according to the Auftragstaktik standard, you 
must be very deliberate when it comes to pedagogy. “The fourth way” 
seems to be a fruitful contribution to that deliberation. 
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